Over the past six years,
Musharraf has craftily ingrained himself
and the Pakistani military as
indispensable allies of the Bush Regime
Now, with the Bush presidency
entering a lame-duck phase,
Musharraf is looking beyond this close association
Police officers scuffle with lawyers protesting in Islamabad
Musharraf knows by now as well as anyone
that his number one public liability within Pakistan
is his close association with the Bush presidency
But continued US backing remains vital for Musharraf's regime
How he reconciles the conflicting interests remains to be seen
One thing is for sure
None of Pakistan's previous military dictators
had such mastery over the art of the possible
Pakistan Shakes off US Chains [Original]
What's Democracy Got to Do with It?
The pervasive impression is that the impending judgement by the Supreme Court regarding the propriety of President General Pervez Musharraf's re-election as president of Pakistan for another term prompted the timing of his decision to impose emergency rule last week.
The temptation to view the developments in Pakistan through the prism of democracy is almost irresistible.
But democracy is not even a sub-theme in the current world of realpolitik in Pakistan. At best it forms a miniscule part of the story.
What emerges beyond doubt is that Musharraf's move enjoys the support of the top brass of the Pakistan armed forces.
Significantly, he signed the proclamation on emergency rule in his capacity as the chief of army staff rather than as the president.
He has thereby signaled that the Pakistan armed forces as a whole are backing his move.
The West "Regrets..."
The initial statements of "regret" by the Western capitals, especially Washington, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. To be sure, the US policy toward Pakistan finds itself in a cul-de-sac.
Musharraf's move coincides almost to the hour with the thundering speech by President George W Bush at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based think-tank, on Thursday.
He blasted the US Congress for failing to take his "war on terror" not seriously enough, and he went on to compare Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Lenin.
Addressing his neo-conservative acolytes, Bush came back to his favorite theme that via his "war on terror", he was actually waging a global war for democracy and freedom.
He compared Islamist "plans to build a totalitarian Islamist empire ... stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia" to the Third Reich.
He claimed that US-led campaigns have "liberated 50 million people from the clutches of tyranny" in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bush said the people in the Middle East are "looking to the United States to stand up for them".
Alas, we knew only a day later that just as Bush was speaking, one of his staunchest allies in his pet global war was squashing democracy and freedom.
The US doublespeak becomes all too apparent in the mildly reproachful comment over Musharraf's move, bordering on resignation, by the US spokesmen.
It indicates that Washington's dealings with the Musharraf regime will continue and normal business will resume once the dust has settled down.
The West Needs Musharraf More Than He Needs Them
Musharraf knows that the US dependence on him is only likely to deepen in the coming weeks.
Besides, Musharraf has succeeded in underscoring in Western capitals that he is the anchor of "stability" in Pakistan.
No matter the actual ground reality, he has succeeded in projecting a perceived threat from militants. (The international community has no independent means of verifying these threat perceptions either.)
To a degree, even the reaction by New Delhi - a mild statement of "regret" and a pious hope that "normalcy" will return soon - is an acknowledgement that Musharraf has maintained an overall climate of peace and tranquillity as well as a degree of predictability in relations with India.
Western capitals are quite aware of the extreme fluidity of the situation but are literally forced to suspend their disbelief in Musharraf's claim as the guardian of Pakistan's stability. What choice do they have?
In the short term, therefore, Musharraf doesn't have to look over his shoulder any more or listen to irritating Western hectoring about democracy while he goes about resetting the parameters of Pakistan's political life.
He correctly estimates that what matters most is his apparent willingness to wage a strong military campaign against militants; his helping hand in advancing an "intra-Afghan dialogue" involving the Taliban; and his role in the event of Washington deciding on a military showdown with Iran in the coming months.
In sum, Musharraf assesses he has a relatively free hand to pres ahead with his political agenda within Pakistan.
He must be pretty much fed up with the intrusive attitude adopted by pretentious US functionaries and think-tanks in recent months with regard to Pakistan's political future.
He has a point insofar as there aren't any real "Pakistan experts" as such that the Bush administration could claim to have.
Bush Regime Tried to Forced Bhutto on Musharraf
His sense of exasperation was clearly showing in recent weeks that functionaries in the US administration who have no real grasp of the tough lay of the land in Pakistan have been dictating to him democracy lessons.
They didn't even understand that one way or another, historically, Pakistan always remained on the razor's edge while life moved on.
Washington's insistence that Bhutto should join his team was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.
Under tremendous US pressure, Musharraf, seemingly against his gut instincts, acquiesced with the game plan choreographed in Washington. He knows Bhutto is a complex personality.
But he also knows she has influential supporters, like US ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, whose antipathies toward Musharraf date to his posting in Kabul.
All the same, within the fortnight since Bhutto's arrival in Pakistan from exile on October 12, Musharraf has been proved right.
The American blueprint for Pakistan's democratic transformation became stuck in the mud.
It was so visible that all could see, especially when Bhutto began trading charges that the establishment was conspiring to kill its future prime minister, and the negotiations between the two sides over fine-tuning their "deal" ground to a halt.
The frustrations deepened when Bhutto realized that she was virtually confined to her Karachi home.
Ironically, Musharraf found he could seize the high ground once it began to dawn on Washington that its hare-brained plan to foist Bhutto atop the political heap in Islamabad was simply unworkable.
Plainly put, Bhutto was not acceptable to the Pakistani establishment. Washington had no "Plan B", either.
Musharraf's agenda
Musharraf struck fast. Now that he has "liberated" himself from the political burden that Washington expected him to carry, he feels free to act on his own terms.
This means first and foremost that he will hold both the offices of president and chief of army staff, at least until the elections, whenever they are held (the January date seems unlikely now).
He will in all probability expect a new Supreme Court to endorse his re-election as president, which will enable him to be sworn in for another term in office.
Musharraf's overwhelming win in last month's presidential polls has not yet been ratified by the court.
Musharraf has certainly sized up that Bhutto's political image has been badly tarnished due to her controversial "deal" with him.
It will take a while for her to regain her credibility in popular opinion within Pakistan.
From Musharraf's point of view, therefore, in the short term at least, she is virtually rendered ineffectual as a rallying point of opposition, even assuming that she has the will to act in such a role.
But he may well keep a line of communication open to her. Who knows, he may still have a need for her, but that is something for the future.
More important, Musharraf needs to factor that even after the present setback, Washington and London may still not give up hope completely regarding Bhutto's return to mainstream politics in Pakistan's leadership structure.
The sad reality is that there are no other credible figures in the democratic opposition other than Bhutto who would be prepared in today's circumstances to play according to the US script.
Who has the last laugh?
When the epitaph of the Bush era in Pakistan's contemporary history finally gets to be written in a year's time, there will be a complex, engrossing story to tell.
Bush began reasonably well in 2001 by threatening to bomb the daylight out of Pakistan and to dispatch that country to the Stone Age.
His threat of shock and awe indeed worked. Musharraf quickly fell in line in the "war on terror". The world community applauded Bush. But in the process, Musharraf ensured his regime gained international legitimacy.
Also, Musharraf promptly put a price tag on Pakistan's role in the "war on terror". He negotiated hard.
And he extracted out of the Bush administration in bits and pieces over the past six years a staggering amount of US$10 billion as assistance.
That kept the Pakistani economy going, the army well equipped and his support base intact.
Of course, he took care to endear himself and the Pakistan army as an indispensable ally to Bush.
As time passed, like a skillful commando, he began walking a fine line - in and out of the "war on terror" - almost unnoticed, as he pleased. Certainly, Bush noticed but had to pretend he didn't.
There was no other option. Bush was preoccupied in Iraq, and Musharraf knew that as well.
In fact, Bush, who once saw Russia's President Vladimir Putin's soul in his deep blue eyes and liked it, has no choice but to keep insisting he is on a "hunt" with Musharraf in the Hindu Kush.
Now, with a much-weakened Bush presidency almost entering a lame-duck phase, it is only natural that Musharraf feels he must look ahead.
He will know by now as well as anyone that his number one public liability within Pakistan is his close association with the George W Bush presidency.
But continued US backing remains vital for Musharraf's regime. How he reconciles the conflicting interests remains to be seen.
One thing is for sure. None of Pakistan's previous military dictators had such mastery over the art of the possible.