In one fell swoop, almost overnight,

Pakistan replaces Iran

on the Bush Regime's radar screen

Israel may not like what is happening,

but Cheney and company won't have

even a fighting chance of reviving

the Iran bogey in the remaining year of BushCo

The Bush Regime cannot overlook that the crisis

brewing in Pakistan and Afghanistan may turn out to be

manifold more serious than all of Tehran's nuclear program

and its support of Hamas in Palestine,

Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iraqi Shi'ite militia in Iraq

combined together, let alone the political challenge

posed by Iran's rising regional influence

For the first time since it expounded

the "axis of evil" theory, exactly six years ago

- grouping Iraq, Iran and North Korea -

the Bush Regime is compelled to view Iran

with a sense of proportion

The hardline policies aimed at destabilizing

the Iranian regime look downright

irresponsible in the changed circumstances

A military option is out of the question

A regime change in Tehran? Ridiculous.

U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan [NYT]

Bush’s senior national security advisers are debating whether to expand the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military to conduct far more aggressive covert operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The debate is a response to intelligence reports that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are intensifying efforts there to destabilize the Pakistani government, several senior administration officials said.

Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and a number of Bush’s top national security advisers met Friday at the White House to discuss the proposal, which is part of a broad reassessment of American strategy after the assassination 10 days ago of the Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto.

There was also talk of how to handle the period from now to the Feb. 18 elections, and the aftermath of those elections.

Several of the participants in the meeting argued that the threat to Musharraf's government was now so grave that both Musharraf and Pakistan’s new military leadership were likely to give the United States more latitude, officials said.

But no decisions were made, said the officials, who declined to speak for attribution because of the highly delicate nature of the discussions.

The 'Threat' of an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan [Original]

The Cassandra-like foretelling by American opinion makers almost uniformly makes out that Pakistan may not survive. True, it is hard to be optimistic. Setting right these disjointed times is way past the capacity of the present US administration.

The only silver lining seems to be that in an year's time another team will move into the White House and a clean break becomes possible. Even ardent specialists in the US security community admit as much.

A commentator for Stratfor, a think-tank closely linked to the security establishment, says, "In this endgame, all that the Americans want is the status quo in Pakistan. It is all they can get. And given the way US luck is running, they might not even get that."

It isn't quite a matter of "luck". Plainly speaking, in the winter of 2001, the George W Bush administration bit off more than a superpower should chew in the Khyber Pass. Today, it has no Plan B.

The best hope for the White House is that Pakistani military chief General Ashfaq Kiani "must become Washington's new man in Pakistan" (to quote Stratfor).

That is to say, let's pin the blame for Benazir Bhutto's assassination last week on al-Qaeda, get on with old business and sit out the coming 12 months.

But smart soldiers like Kiani can't be that dumb, can they? Three types of prophets of doom are setting the tone in Washington.

First come the FOBs - "Friends of Benazir". The people in the media, think-tanks and government in the US over whom Bhutto cast her spell - by way of her irresistible personal charm or through the skills of her top-class public relations handlers - simply cannot think of a Pakistan without her.

Second, there are America's legions of South Asia experts from an earlier era who are peeved that the administration with its neo-conservative agenda ignored their advice in the crafting of Washington's post- 2001 Pakistan policy.

They feel vindicated the policy turned out to be a mess. Third comes the tribe of terrorism specialists who proliferated in recent years and are greatly experienced in the politics of fear - including some among them who seem to believe their phantom enemy is of absolutely cosmic significance.

US shuffles Iran cards

But theirs needn't be the only story. The shadow that Bhutto's assassination is casting on regional security is of varied hues. That is how it is already being felt in Tehran.

In one swift sweep, almost overnight, Pakistan replaces Iran on the Bush administration's radar screen.

Israel may not like what is happening, but Vice President Dick Cheney and company won't have even a fighting chance of reviving the Iran bogey in the remaining term of the administration.

The Bush administration cannot overlook that the crisis brewing in Pakistan and Afghanistan may turn out to be manifold more serious than all of Tehran's nuclear program and its support of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iraqi Shi'ite militia in Iraq combined together, let alone the political challenge posed by Iran's rising regional influence.

For the first time since it expounded the "axis of evil" theory, exactly six years ago - grouping Iraq, Iran and North Korea - the Bush administration is compelled to view Iran with a sense of proportion.

The hard-line policies aimed at destabilizing the Iranian regime look downright irresponsible in the changed circumstances. A military option is out of the question. A regime change in Tehran? Ridiculous.

But the "Iran question" as such may not fade away from the Middle East, though rhetoric - US and Iranian - has appreciably diminished in recent weeks.

Part of the problem is that a bitterly contested parliamentary election looms ahead in March in Iran. Nonetheless, Iran-US relations are poised for a change of course.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer to meet her Iranian counterpart Manuchehr Mottaki "any place and any time and anywhere" testifies to that.

There is guarded optimism in Tehran about the upcoming fourth round of US-Iran meetings regarding cooperation over Iraq's stabilization.

Rice said a week ago, "We don't have permanent enemies ... what we have is a policy that is open to ending confrontation or conflict with any country that is willing to meet us on those terms."

Mottaki promptly responded, "Ground can be prepared." He welcomed Washington's "more respectful and logical approach" toward Tehran, which, he insisted, became possible since "they [US officials] have gotten a better understanding of Iran's key role in the region and its determination to obtain its legal rights [for enriching uranium]."

Iranians are pragmatists and after Bhutto's assassination they will have assessed by now that the developments in Pakistan leave the Bush administration with no option but to earnestly probe for ways of normalizing relations with Tehran.

Iran may once again prove to be useful, as in 2001, for the logistical needs of Washington's "war on terror" in Afghanistan.

Arguably, Iran can be a substitute route if the supply lines for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan via Pakistan become choked. NATO and the US cannot get a more realistic partner than Iran for stabilizing Afghanistan.

Iran's cooperation will be useful in forestalling the Taliban's northwardly march to the Amu Darya region and in stabilizing western Afghanistan, where NATO forces are coming under threat.